Responsibility without a Subject: Moral Dilemmas in the Face of Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

The theme of moral responsibility in the face of artificial intelligence opens one of the most complex questions in contemporary philosophy: who bears guilt when the decision no longer belongs to a human subject? In an era where technological autonomy exceeds the limits of direct control, the classical notion of responsibility loses its center, becoming a problem without a subject. This paper explores the tension between algorithmic rationality and moral consciousness, starting from the idea that morality presupposes intentionality, empathy, and self-awareness-dimensions that machines cannot reproduce.

The analysis traces the evolution of the concept of responsibility in the philosophical tradition, from Kant and Jonas to the ethics of modern technology, showing that morality cannot be reduced to calculation. Although autonomous systems may make decisions that are procedurally correct, they remain incapable of grasping the moral meaning of action. Therefore, moral responsibility in the age of artificial intelligence must be reconstructed not as a delegation to machines, but as an extension of human responsibility into the technological sphere.

The article argues that the real problem is not whether machines can make mistakes, but whether humans are still capable of understanding error as an ethical experience. In the absence of a consciousness capable of assuming moral weight, responsibility risks dissolving into a moral void. Confronted with this crisis, the ethics of the future must once again become an ethics of limits-one that recognizes where power ends and duty begins.